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Abstract  
 Extant literature on impact of board capital on firm innovativeness, 
was prior to this research inconclusive, with some studies showing positive, 
negative or no effect.  Anchored on agency, resource dependence and social 
capital theories, the researcher sought to determine impact of social capital 
on innovativeness in banks.  Kenya has experienced innovations in the 
banking sector driven by mobile technologies.  The researcher hypothesized 
that social capital positively impacts firm innovativeness.  Independent 
variables were director interlocks, status and prestige of the directors and 
presence of personal or other affiliations between directors and the bank or 
chief executive.  Two control variables were added, to mitigate their 
confounding effect on bank innovativeness.  A causal research design was 
selected and purposive sampling undertaken to choose respondents to a 
questionnaire.  Unit of analysis was boards of banks.  32 questionnaires were 
returned, a response rate of 74%.  Data was analyzed using SPSS, after 
testing for assumptions made.  The study found there was statistically 
significant relationship between director interlocks and status and prestige of 
the directors and innovativeness of banks.  This study resolved disagreement 
in extant literature, concluding that board interlocks and board status and 
prestige were found to drive innovativeness.  There was no statistically 
significant relationship between presence of personal or other affiliations 
between the directors and the bank or chief executive and bank 
innovativeness.  This study benefits management, in providing a selection 
criteria for directors of entities focusing on innovativeness.  Major limitation 
of the study is the narrow focus on banking sector impacting generalization 
of the study. 
 
Keywords: Board Social Capital, Innovativeness 
 
Introduction 
 Innovation is the process of developing new technological 
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knowledge and putting that knowledge to productive use (Lodh, 2014).  
When innovation is viewed from the standpoint of an attribute of 
organisations, Bantel and Jackson (1989) refer this to innovativeness.  This 
study, consistent with Lodh (2014) conceptualised innovativeness as an 
attribute of the organisations that develop new technological knowledge and 
puts the knowledge to productive use.  I posit that innovativeness of 
commercial banks in Kenya is a fertile ground for academic research because 
of the accelerated rate of adoption of banking innovations.  M-Pesa, M-
Kesho M-Shwari, M-Kopa and Pesalink are some of the significant banking 
innovations in Kenya.  M-Pesa (M for mobile and Pesa for money in 
Swahili, one of the two national languages in Kenya) is a small-value 
electronic payment and store of value system that is accessible on a mobile 
phone (Burns, 2015). 
 Boards of directors play many roles including provision of resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), hiring chief executive (Masulis & Xie, 2011) 
and monitoring and advising management (Haynes and Hillman (2010).  In 
discharging their responsibilities, boards utilize capital, i.e. board capital, 
defined by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) as consisting of both board human 
capital (experience, expertise, reputation) and board relational or social 
capital (network of ties to other firms and external contingencies).   
 There is extensive literature on role of board capital on various firm 
outcomes, namely firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), strategic 
change (Haynes & Hillman, 2010), CEO selection (Tian, Haleban and 
Rajagopalan, 2011) and firm growth (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2008).  
Literature on the role of board capital on innovations as a firm outcome 
exists, but has inherent contradictions. For instance, Bantel and Jackson 
(1989) found that education, a form of board human capital had no 
significant effect on administrative innovation while Dalziel et al. (2011) 
found that directors’ educational qualifications negatively affect research and 
development expenditure, a proxy of innovation.  On the contrary however, 
Subramaniam and Youndt (2005), Chen (2014) and Wincent et al., (2010) 
found a strong association of directors’ advanced education with innovation.  
Johnson et al., (2013) recommend further research to clarify the effect of 
experience, another form of board human capital on firm outcomes. 
 Under resource dependence theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue 
that directors provide resources from elements outside the firm through 
social interaction, enabled by social capital.  This interaction yields resource 
exchanges that may promote innovation (Chen, 2014).  Director interlocks, 
the primary proxy for social capital can cause flow of information hence 
providing resources (Rass et al., 2013), but can also increase the level of 
business of directors sometimes to the detriment of the companies where 
they are directors (Masulis et al., 2012).   
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Literature Review 
Board Social Capital and Innovativeness 
 Board capital, as defined by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) consists of 
both human capital (experience, expertise, reputation) and relational capital 
(network of ties to other firms and external contingencies) and is used by 
boards to perform their roles of monitoring and resource provision (Haynes 
& Hillman, 2010).  Boards of directors perform four roles: hiring and 
monitoring managers, providing information and counsel to managers, and 
linking the corporation to the external environment (Carter et al., 2010).  
These roles are linked to the most popular theoretical frameworks used by 
researchers on corporate governance, namely agency and resource 
dependence theories.  These theories are discussed in later sections.  Masulis 
& Xie (2011) identify the core functions of a board as hiring, firing and 
compensation of managers.  These board functions as identified by Masulis 
& Xie (2011) are perhaps not a true reflection of the practice in the real 
corporate world.  The hiring of lower and middle level managers is a 
function of the top management team while the CEO significantly influences 
hiring his or her team, that is, the top management team. 
 Directors may differ in many important characteristics, such as 
educational and functional background, industry experience, social 
connectedness, insider status, gender and race (Ferreira, 2007).  This is true 
especially considering that there are no formal qualifications for 
directorships.  Hambrick et al., (2008) observe that although boards are 
viewed as homogenous units, anecdotal evidence and available literature 
show that due to various reasons, some directors have far more influence 
than others.  The differences in director characteristics as summarised by 
Ferreira (2007) can be harnessed to yield competitive advantage for the focal 
firm.  No research has determined the effect of board human and social 
capital on firm innovativeness, a core source of competitive advantage.  This 
research pursued this gap and attempted to generate new knowledge in 
ascertaining the effect of board human and social capital on firm 
innovativeness. 
 Consistent with Chen (2014), it is possible that board capital has a 
positive effect on research and investment which is an important determinant 
of a firm’s innovative capabilities.  This researcher recommended extension 
of their study beyond the realm of the Taiwanese electronics they studied to 
include multiple industries and countries so as to enhance generalization of 
their findings.  As the study relied on secondary data, the researcher also 
recommended alternative ways of gathering data.  This research pursues 
extensions to research as recommended by Chen (2014): by studying board 
capital in the banking industry in Kenya and using primary data.  In 
summary, this study makes use of this literature by delineating board capital 
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as a construct that has received inadequate scholarly attention, providing 
guidance on operationalization of board capital, prising open Chen’s (2014) 
recommendations for extension of research all of which this study takes into 
account in taking corporate governance research forward. 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
 Four prominent theoretical frameworks stand out as key in deepening 
our understanding on board capital as it exists in extant literature, discussed 
below. 
 
Agency Theory 
 Agency theory as articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
advances the idea that firm managers behave opportunistically and require 
monitoring and control by the board.  OECD (2004) recommends that a 
number of board members be independent of management and also suggests 
that separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO would further enhance 
independence.  An independent board, as observed by OECD (2004) would 
conduct the board business more objectively, including effectively 
monitoring managers.   
 As observed by Roberts, McNulty & Stiles (2005), agency theory is 
increasingly being criticised for equivocal empirical findings and doubtful 
theoretical assumptions.  A keen scholar evaluating agency theory would 
acknowledge that this classical theory that has had profound influence on 
corporate governance is not without flaws.  First, the assumption of 
opportunistic behaviour has not been conclusively determined empirically. 
Second, the presumed capability by the board to monitor and control 
managers is perhaps premised upon symmetrical information.  This 
assumption, when viewed against the prevalence of information asymmetry 
between directors and management makes the theory a fallacy and therefore 
unsuitable for the study of corporate governance.   
 There is vast literature in support of board independence as envisaged 
by both Jensen and Meckling (1976) and OECD (2004).  However, this 
independence should not be viewed as a silver bullet to corporate governance 
challenges.  A plethora of problems have been witnessed in corporate 
governance despite promulgation of stringent corporate governance 
regulations.  Most notable corporate failures associated with corporate 
governance malpractices are Leahman Brothers that reportedly filed for 
bankruptcy in 2008 due to creative accounting issues and Enron Corporation 
whose failure is associated with inflation of earnings.  Accordingly, agency 
theory is not the most practical lens for understanding corporate governance.  
Consistent with Johnson et al., (2013), increased theoretical specificity in the 
measurement of director characteristics is necessary with a view to moving 
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board characteristics research stream forward.  This approach would ensure 
researchers go beyond board independence and deepen understanding on 
how board decision making affects firm outcomes.   
 Despite the flaws, agency theory served this study well by setting the 
ground for corporate governance phenomenon from which board capital, the 
core of this study proceeds.  Accordingly, resource dependence, human 
capital and social capital theories are reviewed for further insights on 
corporate governance.   
 
Resource Dependence Theory 
 In coming up with this theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that 
firms depend on their environment to survive and succeed and further note 
that boards expect a newly appointed director to support the firm with 
resolving challenges.  This view is reinforced by Carter et al., (2010) who 
find boards of directors as an important link between the corporation and the 
external environment.  This latter finding validates the importance of 
directors in the success of the firm while interacting with the environment. 
 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) present four main benefits of the external 
linkages, first, acquisition of information and expertise that the corporation 
requires in pursuit of business objectives, an example being innovation.  
Second, directors open channels of communication with the environment, 
enabling dissemination and acquisition of information that is pertinent to the 
organization’s business success, including innovation.  Third, directors help 
establish linkages to the entities in the environment and entities that the 
corporation requires in pursuit of business objectives.  Fourth, directors 
legitimize the firm in the external environment. 
 Consistent with Hillman and Dalziel (2003), the limitations of 
resource dependence theory as articulated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) are 
apparent: the theory presents a wide range of resources that directors bring to 
firms but with little specificity of the resources or their potential value.  
Hillman and Dalziel (2003), attempt to deal with this tension by articulating 
board capital (sum of human and social capital of the board) as proxy for the 
board’s ability to provide resources to the firm.  These constructs are dealt 
with later in this chapter.  
 A critical evaluation of resource dependence theory reveals 
ambiguities.  The theory is not expressly clear on the need to appoint 
directors.  First, a firm should be able to procure required support or advice 
from consultants or similar service providers and thus circumvent the need 
for appointment of directors.  Consultants, by their nature specialists in their 
spheres of knowledge should be able to provide superior support to the firms 
than directors.  With proper terms of reference, one would expect to obtain 
superior level of advice and support from consultants relative to directors, 
European Scientific Journal November 2017 edition Vol.13, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
358 
principally because the former are specialists in a given phenomenon while 
the latter are generalists sometimes appointed based on non-objective 
criteria.  Second, the assumption that information flows in and out of the 
firm through directors can be faulted, principally because this role can be 
performed by managers in their interaction with the environment.  However, 
the theory is not in vain as independent directors can provide new 
perspectives than those held by managers who may have vested interests.  
Resource dependence theory serves this study by setting the ground for 
understanding the role played by the directors in running of firms.  It is 
imperative to turn to board human and social capital theories to assess if they 
are perhaps better theoretical lenses for understanding the relationship 
between corporate governance and innovation.   
 
Social Capital Theory 
 Social capital theory can be traced back to Adler and Kwon (2002) 
who reviewed the works of earlier writers from various disciplines including 
sociologists, economists and political scientists.  Adler and Kwon (2002) 
attribute social capital to goodwill that others have toward the focal person 
and this is consistent with Chen (2014) who define social capital as an 
individual’s ability to access resources through a network of relationships.  
The social relations of the directors can therefore be tapped into as sources of 
competitive advantage.  Johnson et al., (2013) observe that social capital can 
be viewed from three levels: directors’ ties to other firms, personal 
relationships with firm managers, or social standing. 
 Most research use ties to other firms as the proxy for the presence or 
lack of social capital.  Directors can be members of one or more boards.  
When a director serves in two or more boards, this is known as a director 
interlock.  Through the interlock ties, directors can occasion flow of 
information and resources into and out of firms and this may positively or 
negatively impact the firm.  Chen (2014) concluded that interlocking 
directorate ties indeed are positively related to a firms’ research and 
development stance, a proxy for innovation.  This theory serves this study by 
supplying the key social capital predictor variables for firm innovativeness, 
namely directors interlocks, status and prestige as well as personal or 
business connections between the directors and the chief executive.  
 
Innovation in the banking industry in Kenya 
 Innovativeness of commercial banks in Kenya has manifested itself 
through accelerated use of mobile banking products.  The financial sector in 
Kenya is well developed as demonstrated, for instance, by having forty-three 
licensed commercial banks, nine deposit taking micro finance institutions an 
over 3000 SACCOs (Omwansa & Waema, 2014).  In recent times, excluding 
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human resource costs, investments in technology by commercial banks is 
often the largest line item and perhaps the fastest growing (Aduda and 
Kingoo, 2012), perhaps all geared towards innovations.  Innovations in the 
banking industry in Kenya include adoption of Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), smart cards, internet and mobile banking (Okiro and Ndungu, 
2013).  Consistent with Marfo-Yiadom and Ansong (2012), the Central Bank 
of Kenya observes that increase in the use of technology by banks has been 
driven mainly by stiff competition leading them to adopt cost effective 
channels in offering financial services to ensure efficiency and increase 
market share. 
 M-Pesa, M-Kesho M-Shwari and M-Kopa are the most significant 
banking innovations in Kenya.  M-Pesa is a small-value electronic payment 
and store of value system that is accessible on a mobile phone (Burns, 2015).  
This mobile money service provided by Safaricom, one of the 
telecommunications firms in Kenya, (Eijkman, Kendall & Mas, 2010) was 
introduced in Kenya in 2007 (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012) and enables 
customers to deposit and make payments using their mobile phones.  Dalton,, 
Pamuk, van Soest, Ramrattan, & Uras (2017) in their study estimated that in 
Kenya, 95% households were using M-Pesa.  As manifestation of wide 
adoption of this technology, in 2013, M-Pesa transactions amounted to 
US$24 billion, more than half Kenya’s GDP (Burns 2014). 
 M-Kesho is the interest-bearing bank integrated mobile saving 
system introduced in Kenya in 2010 (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012), 
introduced into the market by Equity Bank and Safaricom.  M-Shwari is a 
bank account offering savings and loans to M-Pesa customers, (Cook & 
McKay, 2015).  M-Kopa, provides micro-financed energy products in Kenya 
to M-Pesa customers, (Nique & Opala, 2014).  These three products, in 
addition to M-Pesa are manifestations of an innovative mobile banking 
service in Kenya over the recent past.  
 Pesalink (Pesa for money in Swahili), as reported in popular press is 
a real time interbank money transfer service available to bank customers 
effective July 2017, after four months of piloting.  Transactions can be 
initiated from a mobile phone, internet banking, Automated Teller Machine 
or in a bank’s branch or agency, with the end to end transaction taking less 
than a minute to complete.  Under Pesalink, customers can transact amounts 
ranging from Kshs. 10 upto Kshs. 999,999 at any time.  This service allows 
banks to share innovative infrastructure in delivery of cost effective and 
secure services to the banking community.  As the service had only recently 
been launched, there were no publicly available statistics on uptake of the 
service, specifically regarding number of customers who have commenced 
use of Pesalink and amounts of money transacted on Pesalink.  
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The link between board capital and innovation 
 Social capital is regarded as the bedrock of innovation, principally 
because innovation is a collaborative effort (Subramaniam &Youndt, 2005).  
This assertion was later validated by Zheng (2010) who observed that 
network size, uniqueness of the ties in the network, strength of the ties and 
the relative position of a player have a significant impact on innovation and 
further concluded that social capital is a recent addition to the list of 
innovation-inducing factors.  Assuming that innovations often involve 
multiple functions of an organization, Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) are 
perhaps right that it would take social capital to ensure innovativeness.  
Teams that do not connect with others may frustrate idea creation process 
and this would kill innovation.  Rass et al., (2013) conclude that high 
amounts of social capital provide access to knowledge and medium of 
exchange of that knowledge which facilitates innovation.  Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) define board capital as the sum of human (experience, 
expertise, reputation) and relational or social capital of the board of directors.   
 From a resource based view, firms tap into human and social capitals 
of the directors for their monitoring and advisory resources.  From the 
general assumption that human capital held by an actor will influence his or 
her social capital, it is possible that at board level social capital and human 
capital influence one another.  Assuming that this holds, the benefits 
accruing from human capital would be inseparable from those accruing from 
social capital.  Accordingly, there is merit in studying the impact of both 
human and social capitals on innovation. 
 
Board social capital and innovation 
 Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002).  Essentially, social capital is derived from social 
relations of the directors, within and outside the focal organisation.  Recent 
theories underlying social capital reveal two dominant types of social capital: 
ties to external organisations and high status or prestige (Johnson et al., 
2011).  Each of these social constructs are discussed below to the extent that 
they affect innovation.  This study adds a third construct, personal 
relationships or affiliations between the directors and chief executive that 
existing literature finds as requiring further research.   
 
Director interlocks and innovation 
 Johnson et al., (2013) observe that information and resources flow 
into and out of focal firms based on the ties the directors have.  Haynes & 
Hillman (2010) conclude that director interlocks enable access to better 
information which enables the focal firm to quickly understand industry 
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events and trends.  The ties could take the form of a director having full time 
employment in another firm or sitting on the board of another. 
 Extant literature has identified pros and cons of director interlocks.  
Directors with a valuable tie can provide vicarious experience (Johnson et 
al., 2013) as they will observe how their fellow directors in the firms where 
they serve as directors will deal with a variety of issues or decisions.  
Directors with external directorships gather more information but are also 
too busy to adequately monitor and advise firms.  Looked at in totality, 
director interlocks can be another double-edged sword as there are benefits 
and costs that can accrue contemporaneously.  Every cloud has a silver lining 
and one would be persuaded to agree with Rass et al., (2013) that having 
network ties provide access to resources that are relevant for innovation.  
This study will test the effect of board interconnectedness on bank 
innovativeness. 
 
Status of directors and innovation 
 Prestigious directors or directors with high status are likely to seek to 
maintain or enhance their social standing (Johnson et al., 2011).  Directors’ 
reputation in the industry is of importance to the individuals and the firms 
they represent.  This is consistent with Johnson et al., (2011) who posit that 
directors with prestige will invite people with prestige to join their boards 
and those being invited will also evaluate the prestige of both the directors 
and the firm they are being invited to join.  It is possible that industry 
leadership for example in profitability or innovation are some of the 
attributes that yield status and prestige for both the firm and the directors of 
that firm. 
 Johnson et al., (2011) have in their journal summarized how various 
past research has measured status and prestige, and these include attendance 
at an elite school, experience at a prominent firm and experience at firms 
generally recognized as prestigious.  Experience at prominent firms in the 
focal industry is perhaps the only measure that can be linked to innovation 
on the basis that prominent firms have the resources required to invest in 
research and development necessary for innovation.  Further, with a vast 
resource base such firms would be best placed to try new products in the 
markets without significantly affecting their bottom lines.  This study tested 
the effect of status of directors on bank innovativeness. 
 
Personal relationships or affiliations between the directors and chief 
executive and innovation 
 Social capital can accrue from personal and loyalty relationships as 
these can affect the incentive of the directors (Adler & Kwon, 2002) or 
compromise their independence although the same could enhance open 
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communications.  Johnson et al., (2012) outlines the various relations that a 
director can have with the chief executive of the focal firm: business for 
example a customer or supplier resulting in an affiliation, a perception of 
‘owing’ where the director has been appointed by the chief executive or 
personal where the director has personal or family connections with the chief 
executive. 
 Review of various peer reviewed journals by Johnson et al., (2012) 
on the effect of these relationships to various firm outcomes yield mixed 
results, but suggest that these relations influence the level of advice and 
counsel in addition to strengthening the acceptability of the information.  
This study theorizes that the presence of these relations should enhance the 
advisory and counsel role of the directors and this is likely to result in 
innovativeness.  This study tested the effect of director’s relations with the 
chief executive on bank innovativeness. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 From review of extant literature, the independent variables, from 
which plausible relationships with the dependent variables are hypothesized, 
are shown in the conceptual framework in figure 2.1, overleaf.  
Conceptual Framework of how Board social capital affects 
innovativeness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Interrelationship between variables subsumed in the study 
 
Bank Innovativeness 
Control variables: 
1. Firm age 
2. Firm performance 
 
Board interlocks 
Board Status / Prestige 
Personal / business 
relations with chief 
executive 
European Scientific Journal November 2017 edition Vol.13, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
363 
Research Methodology 
Research Paradigm 
 Research methodology deals with totality of procedures undertaken 
to uncover new knowledge.  The steps taken by individual researchers in 
their search for knowledge depends on the way the researchers perceive the 
world.  Research paradigm can be viewed from a philosophy and perspective 
point of view.  Research philosophy deals with the sourcing of data, the 
nature of the data used for the research as well as how the knowledge is to be 
developed.  This study utilised data collected from directors of commercial 
banks using a questionnaire.  Questionnaires were sent out in quarter one of 
2016, with telephonic follow ups being made to enhance response rate.  The 
researcher believed this was the most effective method of extracting 
information from the directors of commercial banks, seeing that they are a 
busy lot.  Secondary data was obtained from the published financial 
statements of the commercial banks for the listed firms, with the researcher 
gaining access to corporate websites for the unlisted banks to obtain 
secondary data.  With regard to research approach, this research was a 
quantitative rather than qualitative one considering the objective of 
attempting to explain whether or not board capital drives firm innovativeness  
 
Research Design 
 Research can be broadly categorised into exploratory, descriptive or 
explanatory, (Zikmund et al., 2012).  Whereas explanatory research is aimed 
at hypothesis testing to establish the cause and effect relationships, 
exploratory research provides insights on a subject, thereby setting ground 
for further investigation.  Descriptive research concerns itself with provision 
with information about people, organisations or objects.  This is a causal 
research in which the effect of board human and social capital on 
innovativeness of commercial banks was investigated.  Causal research 
design was preferred over exploratory or descriptive research designs as this 
study focused on specific research hypothesis aimed at generating 
managerially actionable results (Zikmund et al., 2012).  
 
Target population 
 Consistent with Aduda and Kingoo (2012), the target population 
consisted of all the commercial banks in Kenya.  Under the study, board 
human and social capital of the boards as well as the innovativeness of the 
banks were ascertained from questionnaires completed by at least one 
director of the forty-three banks.  
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Sample size and sampling method 
 The sample size was forty-three and this study employed purposive 
sampling technique.  The sample size of 43 was appropriate for multiple 
regression, consistent with Hair et al, (2010) who opine that small samples, 
characterised by fewer than 30 observations are only appropriate for simple 
regression with a single independent variable.  As the study specified six 
independent variables, the researcher took special care to ensure that 
completed questionnaires exceeded 30, the threshold for use of multiple 
regression analysis as espoused by Hair et al, (2010.  One of the tactics 
deployed by the researcher was to send out questionnaires to the managing 
directors of the forty-three banks.  This way, response rate would be 
enhanced if questionnaires are addressed to the organisational 
representatives, i.e. to managing directors, rather than to individuals, 
consistent with Baruch (1999).  Also, similar to the approach used by Bantel 
& Jackson (1989), follow up mails were sent to the respondents who had not 
responded within a month of sending the questionnaires out.  Where 
responses were not obtained, telephonic follow up was made with the 
executive assistants of the managing directors.  When the follow ups bore no 
fruit, the researcher chose to obtain responses from either an independent 
director, chairman, company secretary or chief finance officer of the banks, 
all of whom were deemed to be knowledgeable of the constructs under study.  
 
Data collection 
 This study made use of both primary and secondary data.  Table 3.1 
includes definition of the data collected as well as the source.  Primary data 
was collected mainly from managing directors of commercial banks via use 
of questionnaires.  Following Buzzacchi et al., (1995), care was taken to 
ensure presence in the sample of large, medium and small tier banks.  Where 
questionnaires were not received from some bank tiers, telephonic follow up 
was done.  The directors were assured that the data was being collected for 
academic purposes only and that confidentiality will be observed.  
Personalized letters (see appendix 1) accompanying the questionnaires were 
sent to the directors using the postal addresses of the respective banks, see 
appendix 6.  These letters stated the purposes of the research and how the 
results were going to be used.  A research assistant was hired to help with 
data collection and coding.  The data was collected between the months of 
April through to October 2016, after mailing the questionnaires earlier, in 
April 2016.   
 
Validity and Reliability 
 Construct validity can be viewed from a face validity, content 
validity and criterion validity points of view.  Face validity refers to a 
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subjective rather than objective assessment whether a test measures the 
concept it is designed to measure, and that a lay person can agree that the 
proposed method is a valid in researching the question, (Greener, 2008).  
Content validity refers to the extent to which a measure covers the domain of 
interest, (Zikmund et al., 2012).  Criterion validity concerns itself with 
operationalization of the constructs being measured.  Construct validity was 
achieved through initial discussions with two members of board of directors 
in the commercial banks.  These two directors were not part of the final list 
of sampled directors.  Also, discussions were held with two members of 
university faculty prior to sending out the questionnaires, primarily to ensure 
face validity, criterion validity as well as content validity.  These reviews 
helped address clarity of the questions as well as whether the scales captured 
the desired information.  Review by university faculty ensured that the study 
incorporate expert research experience accumulated in the faculty.  Feedback 
obtained from the reviews was incorporated into the final questionnaire.  
Consistent with Subramaniam and Youndt (2005), reliability was tested by 
calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for each board human and social 
capital construct.  The coefficient alphas were compared with the suggested 
value of 0.60 in deciding whether or not the measures utilized in this study 
were acceptably reliable, (Zikmund et al., 2012). 
 
Measurement of Variables 
 There were three independent variables measuring social capital.  
Two control variables were included to ensure that the findings were not 
confounded by the effect of either the age of the firm or firm performance.  
Board social capital was measured using three variables: director interlocks 
consistent with Rass et al., (2013), directors’ status similar to the study by 
Johnson et al., (2011) and personal connections to the chief executive as 
envisaged by Adler & Kwon (2002) and Johnson et al., (2012).  
Innovativeness, as defined by Lodh (2014) and Crossan & Apaydin (2010) 
was the dependent variable.  With regard to the control variables, firm 
performance was controlled for in keeping with the studies by Jermias & 
Gani (2014) as well as Chen et al., (2013).  Firm age was controlled for 
consistent with Chen et al., (2014). 
 
Director interlocks 
 Director interlocks is often used as proxy for board social capital 
(Chen, 2014; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Wincent et al., 2010).  In 
ascertaining the level of the boards’ connectedness, the study sought to 
establish the interconnectedness of the board.  Using a 5 point Likert scale, 
the respondents were asked to indicate their agreement to the statement that 
‘The directors of our board sit on other boards of firms listed in Securities 
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Exchange’.  A score of 1 indicated strong disagreement with the above 
statement, with a score of 5 indicating strong agreement.  Consistent with 
both logic as well as the findings by Chen, 2014; Haynes & Hillman 2010 
and Wincent et al., 2010, the more the board interconnectedness, the higher 
the anticipation of the innovativeness prospects.  
 
Status of directors 
 Extant literature shows inherent difficulties in the operationalization 
of status or prestige as a construct.  Johnson et al., (2011) reviewed 
biographical statements of the directors in the annual statements to determine 
presence or absence of status for each director.  They identify five types of 
status: academic, business, military, social and political and treated all these 
types of status equally.  No research has articulated whether some types of 
status are more valuable than others.  For the purposes of this research, 
presence of status on the board was ascertained by obtaining respondents’ 
answer when asked to indicate their agreement to the statements that ‘The 
directors of our board have high status relative directors of other banks’ and 
‘The directors of our board have connections to persons who have high status 
and prestige’.  A score of 1 indicated strong disagreement with the above 
statement, with a score of 5 indicating strong agreement.  Consistent with 
logic, the higher the board status, the better the innovativeness prospects. 
 
Personal relationships or affiliations of directors with the chief executive 
 Available literature suggests that while ties to other organizations act 
as a conduit for information, friendship and other affiliations seem to 
strengthen the acceptability of that information, (Johnson et al., 2011).  
Under this study presence of friendship or other affiliations was ascertained 
by obtaining respondents’ answers when asked to indicate their agreement to 
the statements that criteria for joining our board includes business relations 
with the bank and personal relations with Chief Executive.  A score of 1 
indicated strong disagreement with the above statement, with a score of 5 
indicating strong agreement.  Higher scores on these two questions would 
reveal higher friendship and other affiliations that may strengthen the 
acceptability of information provided by the directors.  Consistent with logic, 
the higher the personal and business connections between board members 
and the focal firm, the better the innovativeness prospects. 
 
Dependent variable: Innovativeness 
 Extant literature shows various methodologies of operationalization 
of innovativeness as a construct.  Zheng (2010) reviewed empirical studies 
on the relationship of social capital and innovation and identified four 
measures of innovation.  First, amount of innovative outcomes such as patent 
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counts.  Second, subjective ratings such as evaluation by senior managers or 
directors.  Third, efforts expended in innovative activities such as resource 
allocation and fourth, emphasis on innovation such as inclusion of 
innovation in the company vision.  Considering contextual factors we picked 
on the second operationalization and sought to rely on the directors’ 
assessment of the innovativeness of the banks where they serve as directors 
with the use of 5 point Likert scale questions.  Measurement of 
innovativeness by directors of the respective banks would provide better 
insights on the banks’ innovativeness based on the belief that the respondents 
had sound firm level information at their disposal. 
 Under this study, innovativeness was ascertained by obtaining 
respondents’ answers to a 5 point Likert scale, where the respondents were 
asked to indicate their agreement to the statements regarding whether their 
banks had rolled out innovative products, policies and structures to support 
innovation; included innovations in their strategic agenda and was actively 
pursuing innovations.  Scores of 1 indicated strong disagreement with the 
above statements, with scores of 5 indicating strong agreement.   
 
Control Variables: Firm age and Firm performance 
 In line with Bantel and Jackson (1989), this study was not intended to 
examine a complete model for innovation but rather to examine the role of 
board capital in firm innovativeness.  Based on prior literature, there are 
many other variables that impact innovation.  Two control variables were 
included in this study in keeping with the principle of parsimony.  It was 
necessary to control for the effect of firm age and firm performance to ensure 
that our findings were not confounded by their effect on firm innovativeness.  
Consistent with Jermias and Gani (2014) as well as Chen et al., (2013), firm 
performance was controlled for because some studies have shown that 
unprofitable firms reduce their research and development expenditure (a 
proxy for innovation) with other studies suggesting that less profitable firms 
experiment with innovative activity. 
 Following Chen et al., (2013), this study also controlled for firm age 
measured by number of years the bank had been in existence because some 
studies have shown a negative relationship between a firm’s age and research 
and development expenditure (a proxy of innovation).  Firm age was sourced 
from corporate web sites (appendix 6) while firm performance was measured 
as firm’s profit before tax for the year ended 2015.  
 
Data Analysis 
 Consistent with Haynes and Hillman (2010), the main effect of board 
capital on innovativeness as a firm outcome was tested using multiple linear 
regression model.  Multiple regression was used to determine the presence 
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of, and the strength of relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables.  Modelling was done to determine the causation between human 
and social capital of the board and firm innovativeness.  The effect of six 
predictor variables derived from human and social capital constructs on the 
single dependent variable (innovativeness) was ascertained and reported in 
chapter four.  Data was coded and analysed with the use of SPSS.  
Descriptive statistics as well as cross tabulation was used for data analysis 
and reporting.  
 With the use of Pearson product-moment correlation, beta 
coefficients were calculated to determine the direction and extent of 
relationship between the individual human and social capital variables and 
innovativeness.  The matrix of coefficients was inspected for signs of 
multicollinearity.  Further tests on multicollinearity were conducted, 
including calculation of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).  The values were 
compared to the rule of thumb’s 10 or more values, the threshold indicating 
existence of multicollinearity (Salkind, 2007). 
 Consistent with Chen (2014), this study made use of lagged 
hierarchical regression analysis.  First, the main effects variables (directors’ 
education, experience, interlocks, status / prestige, connections to chief 
executive and functional diversity) were successively introduced and 
regressed against the dependent variable.  Finally, the interactive effects 
(directors’ education * directors’ experience) as well as the control variables 
(firm age and firm performance) were introduced and regressed against the 
dependent variable.  For each model, Shrunken or adjusted 𝑅2 was computed 
to show the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by 
the independent or control variables in the model.   
 
Model Specification 
 In keeping with the principle of parsimony, only three independent 
and two control variables were included in the model specification, as shown 
below: 
Model I: 𝐼𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑎) + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑝)+∈ 
Model II: 𝐼𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑝) + 𝛽3(Pr)+∈ 
The models allowed us to estimate the effects of board capital on the firms’ 
innovativeness.  The variables in the model were as follows:  
𝐼𝑛𝑛 = dependent variable, innovativeness as measured by directors of the 
focal firm, on a 5 point Likert scale; 
𝛽0 = constant 
𝛽 = coefficients, for variables Fa, Fp, Di, Sp, and Pr described here below: 
Fa = represents firm age in terms of the number of years the bank has been 
in existence. This information was obtained from the corporate web sites;  
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Fp is firm performance, measured by the focal firms’ profit before tax for the 
year ended 2015; 
Di represents directors’ interlocks measured measured using a 5 point likert-
type question; 
Sp represents the presence or absence of status of individual board members 
measured using a 5 point likert-type question; 
Pr represents the presence or lack of personal relations between the board 
member and the chief executive of the focal firm measured using a 5 point 
likert-type question, and 
∈ is the error term associated with unobservable factors driving 
innovativeness. 
 
Model assumptions 
 Four principal assumptions were made regarding the model.  During 
data analysis stage of this, investigations were conducted on the observed 
data to ensure that the underlying assumptions had not been violated.  First, 
it had been assumed that observed variables will follow a normal 
distribution.  Consistent with Tarus & Omandi (2013), a plot of residuals 
was undertaken to validate the normal distribution.  Second, it had been 
assumed that the relationship between human and social capital of the board 
and firm innovativeness would be linear.  Third, an assumption of 
independence had been made for the observed data. With use of SPSS, we 
undertook Durbin-Watson test to check the data for autocorrelation similar to 
the study by Tarus & Omandi (2013).  Lastly, homoscedasticity was 
presumed, meaning that random errors had the same constant variance (Yan, 
2009).   
 
Ethical issues 
 The cover letter accompanying the questionnaire indicated that the 
questionnaire had been developed for academic purposes and that responses 
will be treated in confidence.  Respondents were provided with the 
researchers’ contact details to raise any concerns.  
 
Results 
Response Rate and generalizability of results 
 Out of the 43 questionnaires sent to selected respondents of the 43 
commercial banks, 32 were completed and returned to the researcher, 
representing a 74.4% response rate.  This response rate is deemed 
appropriate as it exceeded the 70% threshold rule of thumb according to 
Kothari (2007).  The study results were deemed to be generalizable, 
principally based on two criteria.  First, the number of observations per 
independent variable not only exceeded the minimum acceptable threshold 
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of five, but attained the desirable level of between fifteen and twenty, and 
second, the sample was representative, Hair et al, (2010).   
 
Robustness Tests  
Validity Test 
 Prior to data collection, the instrument was subjected to face validity 
test.  Construct validity was achieved through initial discussions with two 
members of board of directors in the commercial banks as well as two 
members of university faculty.  This ensured face validity, criterion validity 
as well as content validity.  These reviews helped to address clarity of the 
questions as well as concerns on whether or not the scales captured the 
desired information.  The review by university faculty ensured that the study 
incorporates expert research experience accumulated in the faculty.  
Feedback obtained from the reviews was incorporated into the final 
questionnaire.  
 
Reliability Test 
 Consistent with Subramaniam and Youndt (2005), reliability was 
tested by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for each board human 
and social capital constructs.. The coefficient alphas for social capital and 
innovativeness of .742 and .891 respectievly  were in excess of the rule of 
thumb values of 0.60 and 0.70 as suggested by Zikmund et al., (2012) and 
De Vaus (2001) respectively.  From the results, it can be concluded that the 
constructs measured had the adequate threshold of reliability for the 
subsequent stages of analysis since all the Cronbach Alpha values were 
greater than 0.6.  
 
Factor Analysis 
 Consistent with Yang (2014), exploratory data analysis was 
undertaken to ascertain potential redundancy.  Factor loadings were 
generated from SPSS for all the constructs and inspected for potential weak 
loading.  The factor loadings were compared to the threshold suggested by 
De Vaus (2002) who recommended that items with factor loadings below 
coefficient of 0.3 should be excluded.  The factor loadings generated for this 
study had strong factor loadings, with the item ‘Directors of our banks’ 
board possess at least one academic degree’ having a coefficient of 0.794, 
making it a key factor influencing innovativeness in banks.  Accordingly, no 
item was excluded from subsequent analysis. 
 
Auto-correlation  
 Similar to the study by Tarus & Omandi (2013), Durbin-Watson test 
was calculated to check the data for autocorrelation among variables. The 
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Durbin-Watson statistic at 1.873 suggests that the data is free from 
autocorrelation, based on Ott & Longnecker (2001)’s rule of thumb that 
critical values below 1.5 and above 2.5 give suspicion to positive or negative 
serial correlation. Based on these findings, the study concluded that linearity 
assumption obtained before proceeding to undertake multiple regression 
analysis.  
 
Test for Normality  
 Normality test was undertaken by plotting the residuals, consistent 
with Tarus & Omandi (2013).  The variables were subjected to normality 
tests to check whether the data provided by the dependent variable (Y) was 
normally distributed. The assumption of normality for innovativeness is 
satisfied.  Further results on the test of normality using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of normality shows negation of normality assumption since the 
p-value of 0.005 is less than 0.05.  This is corroborated by the Shapiro-Wilk 
test, with p-value at .022 that is less than the .05, an indication that the data is 
not from a normally distributed population.  Whereas the numerical methods 
of testing normality are sensitive to sample sizes, from the normal 
distribution curve in appendix seven we discerned that the data was normally 
distributed and proceeded with further robustness tests. 
 
Multicollinearity, Tolerance and VIF 
 Multicollinearity is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more 
predictor variables in a multiple regression model are highly correlated.  We 
tested the independent variables data for multicollinearity by generating 
variance inflation factors (VIF).  We compared the VIF to the rule of thumb 
suggested by Zikmund (2007) that VIF above 5 indicate multicollinearity.  
As the VIF for the variables are in the region of 1, this study concluded there 
was no incidence of multicollinearity.  The tolerance values are a measure of 
the correlation between the predictor variables and can vary between 0 and 1.  
The closer to zero the tolerance value is for a variable, the stronger the 
relationship between the two predictor variables.  
 
Heteroscedasticity 
 Heteroscedasticity means that previous error terms are influencing 
other error terms and this violates the statistical assumption that the error 
terms have a constant variance. This was checked using normal P plots and 
scatter diagrams and there was no evidence of heteroscedasticity.  The 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) was checked in all the analysis and it ranged 
from above 1 to 4 which is not a cause of concern.  
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Descriptive statistics   
 Respondents indicated that business relations with banks was high, 
with a mean of 3.63, closely followed by director interlocks, with a mean of 
3.16. Director status and prestige had the lowest mean score, at 1.68.  
 
Correlation Analysis 
 Similar to the study by Tarus & Omandi (2013), this study made use 
of correlation analysis, the results of which are included in table 4.4.1.  
These results reflect a positive and significant correlation between all the 
variables under study and innovativeness, except for the variable regarding 
presence of relationships between the director and the bank or chief 
executive.  In terms of robustness of the study, the correlation coefficients 
between the independent variables (education, experience, interlocks, 
diversity, presence of status and prestige and presence of relations) range 
between -0.297 and 0.451, indicating that the correlations are not major.   
 
Regression Analysis 
 Consistent with Haynes and Hillman (2010), the main effect of board 
social capital on innovativeness was tested using both Pearson correlation 
and linear regression.  Shrunken or adjusted 𝑅2 was computed to show the 
percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent or control variables in the model.  The results are presented in 
table 4.5.1 overleaf.  Model 1 presents study results of the effect of control 
variables on the dependent variables.  Model 2 presents the main effects 
while model 3 lays out the results of the full model, i.e. control and main 
effects.   
 
Control variables  
 Model 1 revealed an R value (coefficient of determination) of 0.458, 
implying that the control variables explain 45.8% of the variability of the 
dependent variable, innovativeness.  The F critical at 5 percent level of 
significance was 2.27.  Since F calculated is greater than the F critical (value 
=3.852) as shown in Table 4.5.1, this shows that the overall model was 
significant.  The significance is less than 0.05, indicating that the control 
variables explain variation in the dependent variable, innovativeness.  
 With respect to impact of firm performance on innovativeness, the 
regression coefficient is 0.030.  This implies that firm performance accounts 
for 3% of bank’s innovativeness.  With p-value of 0.010, this is evidence that 
there is significant relationship between firm performance and bank 
innovativeness.  Regarding the second control variable, firm age, the 
regression coefficient is 0.020.  This implies that firm age accounts for 2% of 
bank’s innovativeness.  With p-value of 0.154 which is higher than 0.05, this 
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implies that there is no significant positive relationship between firm age and 
innovativeness. 
Table 4.4.1 
Pearson correlation matrix (n=32), (P-values in parenthesis) 
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Director interlocks .380 1     
 (.035)*      
Personal / business relations 0.078 -.120 1    
 (.056) (.512)     
Status/prestige .417 .083 .104 1   
 (.001)* (.652) (.577)    
Experience & education .569 .596 .008 .260   
 (.037)* (.000) (.964) (.151)   
Firm performance 
.453 
(.010) 
-.246 
(.175) 
-.249 
(.177) 
.212 
(.244) 
1  
Firm age .263 
(.154) 
-.297 
(.099) 
-.125 
(.502) 
.013 
(.946) 
.395 
(.025) 
1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Main effects 
 Model 2 revealed an R value (coefficient of determination) of 0.747, 
implying that director interlocks, director’s status and prestige and presence 
of personal relations between directors and chief executive and or the bank 
account for 74.7% of bank innovativeness.  In effect, the main effects as 
outlined explain 74.7% of the variability of the dependent variable, 
innovativeness.  The F critical at 5 percent level of significance was 2.27.  
Since F calculated is greater than the F critical (value =5.262) as shown in 
Table 4.5.1, this shows that the overall model was significant.  The 
significance is less than 0.05, as demonstrated by p-value of .001, indicating 
that the main effects explain variation in innovativeness.  
 With respect to the hypothesis regarding impact of director interlocks 
on bank innovativeness, the results in table 4.5.1 support this hypothesis.  
The regression coefficient for this variable, at .796 and p-value of .001 is 
evidence that there is a significant relationship between director interlocks 
and bank innovativeness.  On the hypothesis dealing with status of directors 
and its associated impact on innovativeness of banks, the results in table 
4.5.1 support this hypothesis.  The regression coefficient for this variable, at 
1.367 and p-values of .032 is evidence that the there is significant 
relationship between functional diversity of directors and bank 
innovativeness.   
 The final hypothesis that had postulated that director’s relations to the 
chief executive officer or other directors’ affiliations to the bank impacted 
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bank innovativeness was also supported.  The results in table 4.5.1 indicate 
that the regression coefficient for this variable, at 0.070 and p-values of .013 
is evidence that there is a statistically significant relationship between this 
variable and bank innovativeness.  This finding is astounding considering the 
Pearson correlation coefficient of .078 with a p-value of .056 as can be seen 
in table 4.5.1 which is a manifestation of absence of a statistically significant 
relationship between this variable and bank innovativeness.  It is not clear 
why correlation and regression analysis yield contradictory results.  
Table 4.5.1: Regression Results 
Variable Model 1  
Control variable 
Model 2  
Main effects 
Intercept 34.11 (1.69) 19.006(7.005) 
Director interlocks  .796(.515)* 
Presence of board status and prestige   1.367(.837)* 
Presence of directors’ relations with bank and chief 
executive 
 .070(.924)* 
Firm performance .030(.050)*  
Firm age .021(.039)  
R .458 .747 
R Square .210 .558 
Adjusted R Square .155 .452 
F 3.852* 5.262* 
Figures represent unstandardized coefficients. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. * 
indicate variable is significant at 5% 
Dependent Variable: innovativeness_fp 
 
Conclusion 
Summary 
 The first objective was to determine the effect of board 
interconnectedness on the innovativeness of banks and had a corresponding 
hypothesis that board interconnectedness has no statistically significant 
effect on innovativeness of commercial banks.  The regression coefficient for 
this variable, at .956 and p-value of .035 is evidence that there is a significant 
relationship between director interlocks and bank innovativeness. 
 The second objective of this study was to investigate the effect of 
status of directors on innovativeness of banks and had a corresponding 
hypothesis that status of directors has no statistically significant effect on 
innovativeness of commercial banks.  The regression coefficient for this 
variable, at .502 and p-values of .001 is evidence that there is significant 
relationship between status of directors and bank innovativeness.   
 The third objective aimed to investigate the effect of directors’ 
relations with the chief executive on innovativeness of banks and had a 
corresponding hypothesis that director’s relations to the chief executive had 
no statistically significant effect on innovativeness of commercial banks.  
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The regression coefficient for this variable, at 0.191 and p-values of .032 is 
statistically significant relationship between this variable and bank 
innovativeness.  The astounding finding is that in model 2, where the control 
variables are introduced, the regression coefficient is .191 with p-value of 
.008, indicating that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
this variable and bank innovativeness 
 
Limitations and recommendations for future research 
 This study was not without limitations.  First, although response rate 
was 74%, the absolute number of observations, at 32 is marginally above the 
threshold of small samples, Hair et al., (2010).  Small samples inherently 
give rise to sampling errors and it is imperative for future research to 
increase the sample size perhaps by studying the service industry in multiple 
sectors, rather than undertaking a sector specific study.  This would enhance 
generalizability of the study findings.   
 Secondly, the unit of analysis in this study was the board of directors.  
Accordingly, the contribution of individual directors was not considered.  
Tian et al., (2011) advocate for research aimed at finding out how 
independent directors can contribute to the focal company.  It is imperative 
that future research is undertaken to ascertain the role played by individual 
directors on innovativeness of the focal company.  
 Most important is use if banking industry, hence a narrow focus that 
may impact on generalizability.  An expanded scope is recommended in a 
bid to move corporate governance research forward. 
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